經理人薪酬與不同型態併購活動之關係

Abstract

本篇論文聚焦在提供給經理人較高的股權基礎薪酬是否會促使經理人完成併購活動，並以不同型態的併購活動來做探討，除此之外，本論文更進一步的研究經理人股權基礎薪酬、市場反應與併購的完成三者間之關係。而本研究顯示，當經理人獲得較高的股權基礎薪酬，則其確實會因而傾向於完成併購活動，然而，當市場對併購宣告有正面反應時，則經理人股權基礎薪酬和併購的完成則存在負相關，其中，相較於敵意併購和非以現金為支付方式之併購，經理人傾向於完成友好併購以及以現金為支付方式之併購活動，而本論文亦發現當市場對併購之宣告有較好的反應，則經理人較可能會因此完成該併購活動，然而即便市場對併購之宣告有負面反應，只要經理人獲得夠高的股權基礎薪酬，經理人仍會選擇去完成該併購活動，最後本篇論文證實了當併購方給其經理人較高的股權基礎薪酬，則併購方股東之長期報酬會因為經理人高估其目標公司之價值而受到損害。

This paper focuses on the question that whether the incentive compensation can induce CEOs to complete the M&As. Moreover, we also attempt to examine the relationship among incentive compensation, market reaction, and completion of the M&As in this study. The findings of this study verify that CEOs with higher incentive compensation to their total compensation can be induced to complete the M&As. However, there is a negative relationship between incentive compensation and the completion of the M&As when the M&As accompany positive market reaction. The friendly M&As and the deals which are paying by cash are more likely to be consummated. Besides, this paper demonstrates that when the market reaction is better, the M&As are more likely to be completed. Even though the market reaction to the deals is negative, CEOs also consummate the M&As as long as the incentive compensation is high enough. Finally, this study confirms that CEOs with higher incentive compensation in the acquiring firms damage the shareholders’ long-term returns in the form of overpayment.