資訊透明度與公司治理之研究

Abstract

本論文主要係透過二個資訊透明度的研究主題，分別用自願性揭露及資訊成本變數來衡量資訊透明度，驗證不同揭露程度對公司價值的影響效果，以及資訊透明度與公司治理的關聯性。第一個研究議題係探討公司自願性揭露資訊，是否影響超額經理人薪酬與公司市場價值的關聯性。本研究主要延續並深入探討Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006)所提出的超額經理人薪酬對公司價值的影響，實證研究結果指出，自願性揭露能減緩超額經理人薪酬與公司價值的負相關。當公司自願的揭露全面性資訊，將使超額經理人薪酬正向影響公司價值，此效果在集團企業中表現更為顯著。此外，研究結果發現，當公司的控制者私有利益較高或是公司存在較佳公司治理的情況下，若公司自願揭露全面性且透明的資訊，能更有效率的減緩代理問題。第二個研究議題係探討外國機構投資人持股對公司治理及績效表現的關聯性，並提出公司資訊成本水準不同下，是否攸關外國機構投資人持股改變對公司績效表現、公司治理提升的影響程度。實證研究結果指出，外資持股的改變對公司績效及公司治理的提升是有正面的影響，且此對於低資訊成本的公司較具影響力;此研究結果驗證了資訊成本對於外資扮演有效外部監督角色的攸關性。

This study contains two essays on information transparency and corporate governance. Two proxy variables are utilized to represent information transparency: voluntary disclosure and information cost. The first essay refines and extends Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) and explores excess executive compensation and its effects on firm value. The results show that excess executive compensation has a positive effect on firm value when firms disclose comprehensive information voluntarily and that this effect is even more pronounced in group-affiliated firms. Moreover, firms that engage in better comprehensive voluntary disclosure appear to alleviate agency problems more effectively when their controllers have a greater private benefit incentive or when the firms have better corporate governance. The second essay is based on an exogenous event and examines whether foreign institutional investors affect firm operating performance and corporate governance when the impact of the cost of information is considered. The results indicate that increasing the amount of foreign institutional investors has a positive effect on firm value and corporate governance. Moreover, the influence of foreign institutional investors is more efficient when the company has low information cost.