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dc.contributor.authorChang, Ray-Yunen_US
dc.contributor.authorHu, Jin-Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Yan-Shuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-02T05:59:36Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-02T05:59:36Z-
dc.date.issued2018-07-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn1935-1704en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0195en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/147914-
dc.description.abstractThis paper establishes a duopoly model with product differentiation and outsourcing in order to analyze the equilibrium competition strategies (choice of prices versus quantities) when the outsourcer outsources its intermediate good to a final product competitor. We show that: (1) both firms choose the quantity strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is low; (2) the choice of competition strategy is the price strategy for the subcontractor and the quantity strategy for the outsourcer when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is moderate; (3) both firms choose the price strategy when the cost efficiency of the subcontractor is sufficiently high.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectcompetition strategyen_US
dc.subjectoutsourcingen_US
dc.subjectintermediate marketen_US
dc.titleThe Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Outsourcingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1515/bejte-2016-0195en_US
dc.identifier.journalB E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICSen_US
dc.citation.volume18en_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000439887400012en_US
dc.citation.woscount0en_US
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