雙占市場中競爭廠商價格與交期訂定之研究

Abstract

對於接單生產(MTO)的廠商，價格與允諾交期的訂定是兩個重要的決策，本論文對在雙占市場中的兩大競爭廠商，建構數學模型，在符合市場限制條件下，找到均衡價格與交期，當兩大廠商用此決策時，雙方均無法單方面改變決策使自己的收益變好。顧客對兩競爭廠商的需求量取決於雙方所訂定的價格與交期。本論文亦針對求解的存在且唯一性做討論，當兩競爭廠商的規模相當時，將可證明均衡解是存在且唯一的；規模不同時，僅可證明求解的存在。最後，利用台灣TFT-LCD面板業為案例對模型的參數進行敏感度分析。

Pricing and lead time are two important decisions in Make-to-Order (MTO) businesses. This research considers the competition of a duopoly market consisting of two MTO firms and presents a model to determine the equilibrium price and lead time of these two competing firms where each firm maximizes its own revenue and is subject to its own constraints in a duopoly market. In the model, customer mean demand rates of two competing firms are assumed as functions of committed lead times and prices provided by these two firms and the market. Furthermore, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution to the problem. When two competing firms are with the same scale, there exist a unique equilibrium price and lead time. However, when the scale of two competing firms is different, the property of uniqueness may not hold. Finally, we conduct the sensitivity analysis of changes in given parameters and draw some managerial insights.