政府補助逆向供應鏈之政策分析

Abstract

逆向供應鏈不同於正向供應鏈，為自消費者端回到生產製造者端之網絡，其中產品壽期結束後之回收工作則為其中一環，且回收議題隨著資源損耗帶來影響環境的負面效應而逐漸受到各方重視。由經濟學者發現，兩階段政策工具同樣能夠有效減少環境的負面外部性。台灣利用兩階段政策工具運行資源回收系統已行之有年，由政府單位向相關責任業者進行課稅，提供補助給資源回收業者。台灣現行資源回收系統，由政府制訂補貼與徵收費率，但並未對補助對象加以著墨。由於資源回收系統中包括集中商、處理商以及最終分解二次料之廠商等。因此本研究發展兩階層基本資源回收系統模型，以分權式（decentralized）的角度，並依據資源回收系統中物流與金流方向之差異，分別考慮不同先行決策者（leader）與決策跟隨者（follower），以及廠商間與消費者交易之市場反應情況，探討政府之補助政策。本研究建構以Stackelberg模型為基礎之政府補貼費率模型，並在政府為求增加回收量之目標下，探討政府在不同補助對象政策的實施下，對於整個資源回收系統造成的影響。經由模型可證明，政府在良好補助對象選擇下，無論先行決策者為何者，皆可帶來較高之回收量。

Due to eco-awareness and legislative requirements, reverse supply chains play an important role in the disposition of end-of-life consumer products. Two-part instrument (2PI), where the government taxes manufacturers, imports, and sellers (MIS) and subsidizes for recyclers, plays a key role in driving or giving incentives to the flows of recycling items. The current recycling system in Taiwan considers the subsidy and disposal fees, but the government neglects discussion on the issue of subsidy location along a recycling chain. This research applies the Stackelberg-typed model to analyze the impact of exogenous subsidies on material flows in a decentralized recycling system where each tier considers its own interests. The model in this research consists of the government and two-tier recyclers. The government determines the subsidy location in order to maximize the recycling quantities. According to the difference of information disclosure time, the roles of the leader and the follower may be different for upstream and downstream tiers. This research concludes the optimal subsidy policy for the government in order to achieve the maximum of recycling quantities.