應用Stackelberg模型探討逆向供應鏈之補貼與徵收費率

Abstract

逆向供應鏈為從消費者端回到生產製造者端之網路系統，而資源回收即為其中的一環。無論官方或民間，資源回收在國際之間已是十分重視的議題，尤其是資訊產品，因伴隨著資訊產品研發速度加快及產量逐漸成長，汰舊換新的速度與廢資訊物品(e-scrap)的數量也隨之增加。由於廢資訊物品中含有毒物質與高價值之貴金屬物質，妥善的處置將有助於環境保護與減少自然資源的浪費，以達永續發展之目的。台灣現行資源回收系統在制定廢資訊物品之資源回收費率時，僅反應各項回收成本以及基金收支平衡，並未考慮周延，故無法有效鼓勵回收行為以降低污染排放量。因此，本研究依據現行制度，在延伸生產者責任與兩階段政策工具的架構之下，以分權式(decentralized)的角度，探討資源回收系統中，各別參與者之各自所關心之決策。本研究在Stackelberg模型架構下，以政府單位為領導者(leader)，責任業者及資源回收業者為跟隨者(followers)，建構廢資訊物品補貼與徵收費率模型，制定最適補貼與徵收費率，並探討費率公式中參數對於費率水準的影響。此外，本研究之數據案例可說明費率模型中，基管會制定最適費率之計算過程，與責任業者及資源回收業者之最適決策過程。所制定之費率在眾業者追求自身利潤極大化的情形下，可使資源回收系統趨於均衡狀態，以及達到社會福利極大化。

Due to environmental concerns and legislative requirements, the disposition of end-of-life scrap electronics (e-scrap) is attracting tremendous attention in many parts. Government subsidies and disposal fees to a recycling system may play important roles in driving or curtailing the flows of recycled items. The current e-scrap recycling system in Taiwan determines the subsidy and disposal fee only under consideration of the balance between revenues and costs along with recycling operations. This paper presents a Stackelberg-typed model examining the impacts of exogenous subsidies and disposal fees on recycled material flows in a decentralized recycling system where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. The model in this paper consists of the government, as a leader, and two groups of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MIS) and recyclers as followers. To maximize the social welfare, the government determines the disposal fee paid by the group of MIS and the subsidy fee subsidizing recyclers when MIS sell or recyclers process a unit of products. After knowing the subsidy and disposal fees, MIS and recyclers behave at the equilibrium status by choosing optimal selling quantity in the market and optimal refund fee for customers who bring end-of-life products back to recyclers. Hence, those subsidy and disposal fees achieve the maximum of the social welfare in the equilibrium status where both MIS and recyclers gain their maximums of self-profits.