應用Stackelberg模型探討競爭市場回收體系的費率制定政策

Abstract

近年來，各國政府開始意識到自然環境資源為耗損財，產品汙染成分與不當的廢棄品處理方式，對環境會產生深遠的影響。因此，綠色供應鏈與環保產品的概念逐漸風行，各國環保法令因應而出，消費者環保意識抬頭，整合正向與逆向物流也開始受到製造商與政府的重視。本研究分析回收體系之參與者的決策時間點，回收基金管理委員會先釋出回收清除處理費率與貼補費率的訊息，責任業者與資源回收處理業者接收訊息後，分別制定最佳製造量與獎勵金水準。根據決策模式之架構，本研究利用Stackelberg模型求得參與者的最佳決策，基管會為先行者（Leader），責任業者與資源回收處理業者為跟隨者（Follower）。台灣現行制度為應用收支平衡的概念進行回收基金的操作與管理，然而，對非營利組織而言，其應就整體社會福利做考量，本論文先依不同操作方式，於相同稅收水準之下，建構獨占市場之費率模型，並利用數值案例進行參數敏感度分析，探討模式可能存在的趨勢。 根據市場現況，產業以寡占市場居多，本研究將獨占情形轉化為多家業者的競爭模型，利用均衡的概念，得到系統參與者的決策結果。再者，市場競爭者數目亦會影響到整體社會福利，本研究進一步探討若資源回收處理業者為相同個體時，回收基金管理委員會應如何制訂最佳回收經營權數目，並佐以數值案例說明模式推演過程。

Due to environmental concerns and legislative requirements, the disposition of end-of-life electronics products is attracting tremendous attention nowadays. We present a Stackelberg-typed model to determine the socially optimal subsidy and advanced recycling fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. Our model consists of the government, as a leader, and two followers, a group of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MIS), and a group of recyclers. To maximize the social welfare, the government determines the advanced recycling fee paid by MIS and the subsidy fee subsidizing recyclers when MIS sell or recyclers process a unit of products. This paper compares performances of the social welfare model and current practice with identical tax revenue in a monopoly market. Then, we demonstrate that our result outperforms the current practice by a numerical case. Furthermore, we relax the assumption of the monopoly market and investigate the model with multiple entities in each market. We discuss the optimal number determination of recyclers with homogeneous entities and illustrate the model procedure by a numerical case.