異質性旅客選擇行為與航空公司市場行銷策略模擬之研究

Abstract

近年來航空公司為了差異化酬賓回饋方案內容，開始進行多元化的企業結盟，例如航空聯盟或是異業結盟，透過提昇點數的使用彈性來吸引航空旅客，然而，過去航空策略聯盟相關研究多為分析航空同業聯盟的結盟效率，鮮少針對異業結盟與強化酬賓回饋方案對旅客選擇航空公司的影響進行探討，因此本研究建構數學模式來模擬異質性旅客動態的選擇行為，模式中包含考量哩程點數的動態制約力、旅客的購票習性、航空公司的服務水準以及行銷策略等。 本研究第一部份使用聯合分析法校估航線之票價、頻次、酬賓哩程方案等屬性效用值，進而以羅吉特模式求得旅客對各航空公司之選擇機率。第二部份的旅運者動態決策行為模式則根據實際航線型態中旅客消費習性不同而分別構建，透過動態的計算酬賓哩程方案對市場佔有率的影響效果。第三部份使用小世界網路架構總體旅運者的人際關係網路，透過不同的狀態之間的轉換表達出旅運者的決策行為，而透過節線傳遞口碑訊息使得個體的決策行為會對網路中其它旅運者產生交互影響。模擬總體市場內競爭航空公司的市場佔有率消長趨勢，藉此比對各種行銷策略對自身與其他競爭者的影響，提供航空公司選擇最佳競爭策略的評估依據。 整合應用本研究一系列模式將可進行實證範例分析，研究結果顯示本研究納入旅客異質性考量，並結合行銷擴散模式以及點數制約力的動態影響之下，所進行的市場佔有率預估能夠包含更全面的影響變因，針對特定航線的模擬市場佔有率與實際值相當吻合，顯示本模式之適用性，更進一步提供航空公司作為策略改變的評估依據，藉由本模式之模擬結果，航空公司可以在實施不同行銷策略之前，預測市場對策略的反應情形，研究結果顯示對市場佔有率較低的航空公司來說，使用降價促銷所刺激的市佔率成長幅度較大；然而對原先市佔率較高的航空公司來說，使用異業聯盟的酬賓哩程方案能帶來較多的旅運需求量。其中降價策略對同質性高的航空公司威脅較大，反之，提昇酬賓哩程方案對異質性競爭業者的影響較劇烈，更進一步從模擬結果發現航空同業聯盟會造成替代性上升的問題。此外，針對酬賓哩程方案進行深入探討，哩程點數是創造旅客忠誠行為的影響因素，研究結果顯示酬賓哩程方案的行銷效果會受到航程距離以及旅運者出國頻次的影響，發現當航程距離較長時，異業聯盟內的低門檻的兌換商品將降低點數對旅客產生的制約力行為，如果長程航線內旅客搭乘頻率提昇，會加速點數的累積而過於輕易達到兌換門檻，導致哩程點數無法達到產生旅客忠誠的目標；反之，對短程航線來說，異業聯盟的低門檻兌換商品能夠提昇對旅運者的吸引力，當短程航線內旅客的出國頻率提昇時，可以加速點數的累積速度，使得點數產生的制約效果更好，因此出國頻率高低在不同航程距離之下會產生不同的影響。

As the global air market inches towards liberalization, airlines using intensive and pooling frequent flyer programs (FFP) with airline and non-airline partners has become a new strategy in order to remain competitive. Although much research has been carried out to evaluate the impact of airline alliance, little has been done on the impact of non-airline alliance and FFP on passengers’ airline choices. This study aims to construct models to explore the dynamic behavior of heterogeneous passengers’ choices on airline taking into account mileage accumulation, habitual behavior, airline FFP, service and marketing strategies. The study first applies conjoint analysis to estimate the utility of competitive carriers featured with price, flight frequency, FFP, etc, then use logit model to estimate the probability of passenger choice on each carrier. The second part of the study presents a diffusion model that explicitly explores dynamic consumer decision-making as affected by social influence, incentive from FFP, and personal preference. In our model, travelers’ probability of airline choice depends on the heterogeneity in the travelers’ habitual behavior. Besides, the effects of FFP on individual passenger’ choice on specific airline will be dynamically varied with his/her accumulated miles. The third part of this study attempts to conceptually apply the small-world network to describe the interaction within social network. We use different states to present consumer’s decision-making process and dynamically evaluate social influence from the decision of individuals’ acquaintance. A series of models systematically constructs the simulation of market share, which quantify the effect of FFP strategies, hence the simulation result may benefit airlines as regard to choose optimal strategies. A series of case studies are performed to demonstrate the applications of the models. The results show that the simulation results are pretty close to the market share on real world, which verify the effectiveness of comprehensive considerations such as consumer heterogeneity, dynamic FFP point’s incentive, and social influence. In addition, by applying the model, airlines can evaluate different strategies before implementation. The results show that pricing strategy is more suitable for smaller carriers; in contrast, pooling FFP with non-airline partner is the better strategy for larger carriers. When one of carriers adopts pricing strategy, the other carriers with similar service attributes will suffer form huge impact, whereas carrier with distinct attributes may lose revenue when its rival allied with non-airline partner. The results also show that parallel code-sharing strategy lead to higher substitutability between airlines. While the increased number of non-airline partners increases the accrual and redemptive opportunities for travelers, it is also possible for decreasing their carrier loyalty. The results show that, for long-haul routes, the redemption requiring less points lead to decreasing the carrier loyalty effect. Moreover, it also reduces the incentive of pooling FFP for long-haul travelers with frequent travels. On the contrast, the low-point threshold redemption provided by non-airline partner can increase carrier attraction for short-haul travelers.