雙佔代理市場下獨家代理權之最適轉換策略：實質選擇權賽局之應用

Abstract

本研究針對雙佔代理市場來分析最適轉換獨家代理商的決策並根據Shackleton et al. (2004) 所提出的模型加以修改更符合雙佔代理市場的一般假設。本研究考慮一個新的變數：佣金比率。透過實質選擇權賽局的方法得到最適轉換策略，此最適轉換策略隱含市場均衡。根據本研究結果顯示，發現高淨成長率以及低獲利波動度的代理商最容易成為獨家代理商，並且在佣金比率越高以及獲利波動相關係數越高和轉換成本越高的環境下，轉換越不容易發生。最後，本研究發現當遲滯效果變大不能代表轉換機率變小。

This paper modifies from Shackleton et al. (2004) to analyze the optimal switching strategy decision in a duopoly agent market. We introduce a commission rate. By the real options game approach, we derive the optimal switching strategy showing the equilibrium in the market. The results demonstrate that the agent with higher net growth rate and lower volatility is more likely to be the exclusive agent. In addition, under the conditions of high commission rate, high correlation coefficient of the net profitability volatility and high total switching costs, switching is less likely to appear. Moreover, we find out the hysteresis is not the factor to affect the switching probability.