機構投資者在集中股權結構下之公司治理角色定位─以高階主管異動為例

Abstract

台灣證券集中市場以家族集中持有為主，加上透過交叉持股金字塔結構，使得管理階層在公司內之權威更加集中，相對之下機構投資人之投資比重偏低。本論文透過機構投資人在高階主管異動前後持股之變動研究股權機中度是否影響機構投資人在公司治理中扮演的角色。研究結果有三：第一，考量股權集中下直接參與之成本效益，機構投資人傾向透過出售股票的方式來影響公司決策及管理階層之行為。第二，利用外部繼承與內部繼承後之機構投資人相反之持股變動說明上述機構投資人出售股票之真正意圖為影響公司決策及管理階層之行為，而非交易策略。第三，經由機構投資人意圖透過出售股票來影響決策之公司，本文透過董事會有效性之研究僅能部分支持日後公司治理有改善之現象。本論文之結論為，相較於歐美等已開發國家中相對多數之機構投資人，考量市場及公司特性，機構投資人參與公司治理的角色也隨之改變，以台灣為例，機構投資人形成一種透過股權持有影響公司治理之消極參與角色。

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance under the market where concentrated family control is the most widespread form of ownership, namely Taiwan. By investigating how institutional investors behave around top management turnovers, for instance, chairman of board and CEO replacements, the results suggest institutional investors are more likely to abandon a stock while turnovers come up in firms under concentrated ownership structure. Furthermore, the intention of institutional selling to influence corporate decisions is illustrated by different directions of institutional holding changes between outside succession and inside succession following forced top management turnovers in family-controlled firms. However, the evidence only partially supports those intended selling from institutional investors can lead to corporate governance improvement after top management turnovers.