競爭法上價格擠壓違法性之再省思：美歐新近案例發展與理論探討

Abstract

價格擠壓（price squeeze, margin squeeze）係指一個同時經營上下游兩市場之垂直整合事業，其於上游市場具有獨占地位，而當下游市場其他競爭者要求與其交易時，垂直整合事業所訂定之批發價格相較於其零售價格，將使競爭對手無利可圖而退出市場，因而可能達到削弱下游市場競爭之效果。 本文擬由維持下游競爭秩序之角度出發，分析禁止價格擠壓之規範是否將對垂直整合獨占事業造成長短期不利影響，再輔以各國案例發展及文獻討論，觀察價格擠壓規範與獨占事業、競爭者、產業發展及消費者之間的互動關係。 本文認為，若技術上、經濟上的發展已實現下游競爭之可能，亦即上下游之服務或產品不限於由同一事業供應或經營，則保障下游競爭將有助於提升下游市場之經營效率，甚至有助於間接促進整體產業發展。因此競爭法上價格擠壓之判斷應建立合理原則（rule of reason），以符合明確性、可行性的判斷標準，充分評估限制獨占事業交易自由後，所隱含限制及促進競爭效果。

A “price squeeze” (or margin squeeze) is a behavior conducted by a vertically integrated firm, which has the monopoly power at the upstream level, and sells the downstream products and the upstream input to firms that compete with the vertically integrated firm at the downstream level. The effect of price squeeze is debated that the vertically integrated frim may diminish the competition in the downstream market by “squeeze” the margin between the wholesale price and the retail price, so the “equally efficient competitors” cannot survive in the downstream market. The main objective of this article is to analyze the long-term and short-term impacts of the antitrust duty of price squeeze. The article will start from the controversial cases in the U.S. and the EU, and observe the interactions among the stakeholders in the market – the monopolist, the competitors, and the consumers – to examine the legal and industrial policies behind those cases. In the point of view of the protection of the downstream market, when the upstream input and the downstream products could be technologically and economically used and produced by downstream competitors, the competition of the downstream market would trigger the promotion of the efficiency of the downstream production and the long-term development in the industry. Due to the complicated pro-competitive and anti-competitive impacts inherited in the price squeeze behaviors, a proper standard based on the rule of reason is needed to provide a justification on the antitrust law.