標題: 不完全資訊下的債務協商
How to Renegotiation with Imperfect Information?
作者: 賴宏琦
郭家豪
財務金融研究所
關鍵字: 債務協商;不完全資訊;資訊不對稱;renegotiation;imperfect formation,;asymmetry information
公開日期: 2010
摘要: 本研究假設債權人無法得知真實價格,只能以觀察價格來做為債務協商的依據。 從假設推導出股東及債權價值的封閉解後,重新探討在可以債權協商的情形下,是 否有債務不效率的情形。本文指出,當股東比較有協商的權力時,債權人會要求股東支付資訊溢酬來補償資訊不對稱的損失。不過,當債權人比較有 協商的權力時,債權人不會主動的提出債務協商的請求。
When firms experience financial distress, equityholders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debthodlers and paying less than the originally-contracted interest payment. This article incorporates strategic debt service under imperfect information, which debthodlers catch the observation price instead of real price, and develops simple closed-form expression for debt and equity values. We analyze the efficient implication of renegotiation, showing that debthodlers will ask for information premium when equityhodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers and debtholders will never renegotiate actively when debthodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079739501
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/45638
Appears in Collections:Thesis


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