數量彈性與二次訂購契約之供應鏈效益分析

Abstract

Recently, the improvement of manufacturing technology and information technology accelerate the development of supply chain management. So that coordination between supply chain members becomes more and more important. Supply chain contracts for collaborating the relationship between supply chain members thus becomes a powerful tool to improve the competitiveness of the whole supply chain. This thesis focuses on two unconventional supply chain contracts, i.e. quantity-flexibility contract (QFC) and double-ordering contract (DOC). Using simulation analysis, we found that both QFC and DOC can increase the supply chain profitability under certain circumstances. The total supply chain profit effect seems to be more significant for QFC than that for DOC. While the QFC tends to make supply chain gains in all cases tested, the gains tend to increase as the product margin decreases. However, we found that the share of the profit is not fairly distributed. For both QFC and DOC, the buyer tends to take most of the gains and the supplier tends to suffer a loss. Therefore, for sustainable development of supply chain contract relations, an appropriate reward system to the supplier is critical. This provides an important subject for future research.

Recently, the improvement of manufacturing technology and information technology accelerate the development of supply chain management. So that coordination between supply chain members becomes more and more important. Supply chain contracts for collaborating the relationship between supply chain members thus becomes a powerful tool to improve the competitiveness of the whole supply chain. This thesis focuses on two unconventional supply chain contracts, i.e. quantity-flexibility contract (QFC) and double-ordering contract (DOC). Using simulation analysis, we found that both QFC and DOC can increase the supply chain profitability under certain circumstances. The total supply chain profit effect seems to be more significant for QFC than that for DOC. While the QFC tends to make supply chain gains in all cases tested, the gains tend to increase as the product margin decreases. However, we found that the share of the profit is not fairly distributed. For both QFC and DOC, the buyer tends to take most of the gains and the supplier tends to suffer a loss. Therefore, for sustainable development of supply chain contract relations, an appropriate reward system to the supplier is critical. This provides an important subject for future research.