标题: | 第三方利益团体介入政府邻避性建设赛局之研究 The Third Interest Group’s Intervention In NIMBY Case |
作者: | 张庭慎 Chang, Ting-Shen 许钜秉 Sheu, Jiuh-Biing 运输与物流管理学系 |
关键字: | NIMBY;谈判赛局;谈判权力;第三方利益团体;NIMBY;Bargaining Game;Bargaining Power;the Third Interest Group |
公开日期: | 2012 |
摘要: | 邻避性的公共建设虽说最终目的是达成所有公民的公共利益,但在执行时,如同其他类型的政府公共建设一般,受到一部分的人支持,但是往往也会有反对者的出现。此外,相关涉及政府与民众的量化谈判赛局研究可说是少之又少。 本研究的主要贡献为架构一量化之政府与民间邻避性建设谈判机制,并探讨不同类型的第三方利益团体加入后对谈判结构的影响。求解方法为利用赛局理论中Rubinstein的谈判出价概念,求出不同时间序列时赛局参赛者的提议值后,再将临避性建设的特性及谈判权力函数导入,最后求出谈判双方的最佳提议值。试图瞭解民众与政府谈判期间,谈判权力的变化及谈判底限值对于整体谈判结构的影响和结果的改变。同时也探讨利益团体介入谈判前后,分别对谈判双方的影响及进行敏感度分析。 研究分析结果显示,在影响谈判权力的因素中,谈判者对议题的参与程度最为重要,占整体谈判权力结构的29.5%,其次依序为时间对双方的谈判压力(28.4%)、双方掌握的资讯程度(25.8%)、双方对标的物的依赖程度(16.2%)。而在双方的谈判利益方面,研究结果指出第三方利益团体未加入谈判前,政府的底限值愈严格或民众的底限值愈宽松,则双方的利益皆会变大,且利益增加的幅度政府较民众方大;第三方团体加入后,无论该团体属性为何,参赛者的利益与第三方团体的属性不具线性关系,且第三方利益团体底线值的结构将对原先谈判两造的利益产生指数性影响。 The Not In My Back Yard(NIMBY) case, is to ultimately realize the citizen profits as all the other governmental constructions do. However, it cannot meet everyone’s expectations, not all the citizen are in favor of government’s policy. Besides, the relative quantitative research of the bargaining game between government and citizen is much rare. This article mainly contributes to construct an quantitative bargaining system of NIMBY between government and citizen, and discuss the affects of different third interest groups(TIG)’ intervention on model’s stucture. This model is constructed on the base of Rubinstein bargaining concept. Firstly, we compute player’s offer in different time sequence. And then, by inputting the characteristics of NIMBY as well as bargaining power function, we try to obtain the best offer of both sides. Besides, the thesis also aims to study the relationship between bargaining power and original offer, limit value, the whole bargaining structure, and the final banlance offer. Finally, we also do the sensitivity analysis. Analytical results shows that within those factors affecting bargaining power, players’ interest into the issue is the most important one, taking up 29.5% in the whole bargainin structure. Accordingly, time pressure occupying 28.4%, available information 25.8%, dependence on objects 16.2%. Through further research and analysis, the thesis gives bargaining solution as follows, that without TIG’s intervention, profits of both players get large (government gains profit more than citizen) when government reduce its limit value or citizen increase its limit value. After the TIG participates into originally bilateral bargaining, whatever its value is, no lineral relation between its value and players’ profits exist, but the limit value of both players do matter instead. The limit value will cause the exponential effect of profit on both sides. |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079836513 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/47984 |
显示于类别: | Thesis |