基礎建設專案融資之研究-資訊不對稱之影響

Abstract

公共建設民營化中，融資成功與否是很重要的一個環節。然而，在現行公共建設民營化的BOT專案下，在專案融資無追索權(non-recourse)或有限追索權(limited recourse)的特性下，特許公司損失有限，獲利無窮，同時因為銀行與特許公司資訊不對稱，銀行不能直接觀測或控制特許公司的投資風險，此將導致銀行承擔額外不必要的風險與預期報酬的損失，此即為銀行面對的道德風險問題，而此問題會隨著附屬事業加入計畫後變得更嚴重。在道德風險的疑慮下，銀行通常會尋求更多的擔保或是契約條件確保債權，否則不敢貿然投資，而BOT計畫將會以失敗收場。

本研究運用賽局理論的分析方法，分析當特許公司向銀行貸款時，銀行可以如何因應，以解決所面臨的道德風險問題。透過模型分析，本研究發現銀行可以利用貸款額度與有限追索權程度來控制此現象，並存在一個最適貸款額度，極大化銀行本身利潤下，也可降低專案風險，提高專案成功機會，形成雙贏之局面。

本研究繼續擴充模型進而討論政府政策對專案雙方之影響，研究結果顯示了各政策如何影響賽局均衡與政策限制，並分析台灣南北高速鐵路案 。本研究結論由賽局理論探討各契約條件與政府政策對特許公司與銀行之影響，並確保各政策能更有效率的被使用。

The success of financing is one of the key of Infrastructure investment projects. However, under non-recourse or limited recourse project financing arrangements, concessionaires may gain unlimited payoff with limited loss. Besides, with the asymmetric information between banks and concessionaire, bank cannot observe or control the risks which concessionaire takes, bank will afford more risks than expect. This is the moral hazard problem, and this problem will become worse when land-grant-related investments are added. With the doubt of moral hazard, banks always seek more arrangements to secure its right or stop loaning to the project, and the project will be terminated. In this study, game theory is used to analyze this problem. The study finds that bank can lower the amount of loan or raise the limited recourse level to control moral hazard, and there is an optimal credit line which maximizes banks’ profits and lowers the risk of the Infrastructure investment project. Moreover, the study keeps expending the model to analyze how government policies influence Infrastructure investment projects and shows the result. This study also uses those finding to trace the Taiwan’s north-south high-speed rail project. The resulting models would enable a better understanding of many financing arrangements and policies, and insure how the tools could be used in a more effective manner.