政府採購法選商程序之機制設計分析

Abstract

政府採購選商程序為滿足政府採購需求的初始階段，此階段結果影響採購契約的授與及參與人的福利分配。對機制設計者而言，一個好的機制設計應在最低的制度交易成本需求下，達成個人與團體的理性目標。本研究以機制設計理論為方法，運用參與約束與激勵相容約束條件，分析我國政府採購法選商程序制度設計的問題。 本研究建構選商程序的賽局模型，以此為基礎計算出價格競爭機制的最適行為均衡、探討能力競爭機制項目評選的立論基礎以及分析現行招標方法對廠商交易成本的影響。 研究成果發現投標廠商家數越大，機關的採購效率越高；底價設定如同為廠商增加一個虛擬對手的效果；最低價標方法對於採購制度實施的交易成本較低；最有利標的項目評選需具有能力型態差異成本才有區別功能，而現行評選辦法因為授權過大，使得制度運作不具備穩定性，往往會有過度保守或招致濫用的情形；另外，採購選商程序的公平公開，可以降低政府採購的資訊不對稱現象，減少勾結行為的發生。

Contractor selection procedure of Government Procurement Act is the preliminary procedure to satisfy the government procurement demand. The result of this procedure decides who could be the contractors and the welfare allocations of participators. For institution designers, an appropriate act must satisfy individual and social benefits based on a minimal institutional transaction cost. This thesis applies participation constraint and incentive-compatibility constraint of mechanism design theory to analyze the issues of contractor selection procedure. We built a game model of contractor selection procedure to solve for the optimal behavior strategies equilibrium under the price-competitive mechanism, discuss theoretical criteria under the ability-competitive mechanism, and analyze the impact on firm transaction cost under nowadays tendering system. The findings suggest that the more tenders, the more procurement efficiency institutes have; the effect of setting the floor price equals to add a virtual competitor; the lowest price tender system brings less transaction cost to procurement system; the most advantageous tender system works only when the criteria have different ability-basis cost; the existing system is instable due to over-empowerment, which leads to over conservative or right abusing. Finally, the openness and fairness of contractor selection procedure could diminish asymmetric information in government procurement and thus reduce collusions of participators.