標題: 台灣上市公司財務決策代理理論的驗證
A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Dividend Policy in Taiwan
作者: 彭雅惠
Peng, Ya-Hui
王克陸, 李經遠
管理科學系所
關鍵字: 代理問題;代理成本;公司槓桿;多角化;破產成本;自利;Agency Problem;Agency Costs;Corporate Leverage;Diversification;Bankruptcy Cost;Self-interest
公開日期: 1995
摘要: 過去對代理理論的探討大多從經理人自利心是否影響公司決策來著手,而 本論文則是從解決代理問題的角度,探討代理成本與公司財務決策的關係 ,並驗證國內上市公司是否存在代理問題。由於代理成本是一抽象的概念 ,因此本研究利用六項重要的公司特性作為代理成本的替代變數,以探討 代理成本的存在,是否影響公司經理人對經理人持股比率、負債政策及股 利政策的決定。本研究以129家台灣證券交易所第一、二類股票上市公司 ,但不含金融保險業為樣本。研究期間自79年至82年止,共計四年。利用 簡單統計分析及複迴歸模式,驗證代理成本是否影響經理人對公司財務決 策的制訂。實證研究結果發現,國內上市公司確實存在代理問題,經理人 對財務決策的決定受代理成本存在的影響,而且經理人對公司財務決策的 適當組合,可以降低代理成本,增加公司價值。 The Purpose of this research is to examine whether the agency problems exist for listed companies in Taiwan and how the agency costs affect the financial decisions of the firms. Whereas prior studies have examined the leverage policyor dividend policy individually, this research examines managers' ownership decision, leverage policy, and dividend policy simultaneously. The data consists of 129 firms and the sample period is from 1990 to 1993. The methodsused to test the impacts of six firm- specific characteristics on the proxy for agency costs are simple statistics and multiple regression model. The outcomes of this research reveal that the agency problems actually exist. Furthermore, the agency costs will influence the managers to make all three policy decisions and managers can make financial policy tradeoffs to control agency costs.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#NT840457055
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/60885
Appears in Collections:Thesis