國籍民用航空運輸業財務健全情況暨飛航安全之研究

Abstract

過去有關財務衡量因子與飛航安全績效的相關研究包括Rose(1990), Dionne et al.(1997) 及Singal(1998) 等以其嚴謹的檢定方法以及較長期間的觀察大部份皆支持財務表現與航空公司飛航安全之間的關係。以Rose(1990)針對1957-1986年35家航空公司進行研究，使用卜瓦松模式最大概似估計方法結果發現，較低的獲利率和高意外事件率有顯著關係。相關研究亦發現較高的獲利能力或財務評等等級能夠顯示較高的航空公司安全等級。 國內在「開放天空」政策實施之後，民用航空運輸市場競爭加劇，公司經營權之變動因股權取得或合併而發生多次、策略聯盟之使用亦極為頻繁。在此同時，飛航安全的議題也因大型及多次的飛安事件而備受關注。根據IATA的統計，1988-1997年十年來全球重大空難失事統計資料顯示，每百萬飛行時數平均失事率為0.818架次，我國的資料則顯示每百萬飛行時數平均失事率則為3.0架次，生命、財產的損失更是難以估計。相較之下，我國的飛航安全值得擔憂，探討本課題之意義更大。 本研究的目的在於探討國內民用航空市場，特別是在民國七十六年獨占情況逐漸被打破之後，造成班次、承載率產生變化，公司經營權的變化以及各項策略聯盟的使用，使得業者財務狀況發生影響。此財務狀況是否與飛航安全的訊息具攸關性，財務指標所顯示之相對良窳是否與飛安表現呈現一致現象，為本研究深入探究之處。 以民用航空運輸業83年至87年資料進行產業面攸關性分析，單就產生重大傷亡的失事定義而言，財務指標當中負債比率對於航空公司失事事件的發生具有解釋能力，其p值小於10%，為0.0934，且迴歸係數為正，亦即負債比率愈高，失事事件發生的可能性愈高。若將所有飛安事件數包括失事、意外事件及危險事件等皆列入考慮的事故發生率進行檢定，則發現其顯著性亦同，p值為0.0031。顯示航空公司資本結構的優劣能夠作為財務健全性的指標，據以判斷飛航安全的潛在危險。而航空公司投資報酬的多寡，以及固定資產使用效率的高低則對於飛安事件的發生與否不具解釋能力。就負債比率而言，財務比率對於飛航安全的解釋具有有效性，此與過去以營業利益強調獲利能力與飛航安全相關的主張 (Rose 1990) 不盡相同。 針對成立時間是否超過十年來作觀察則分群結果發現，成立超過十年的航空公司其財務比率皆未通過顯著水準10%；成立未及十年的航空公司則財務比率之中的負債比率p值小於10%，為0.0076，通過顯著水準，其他財務比率則不顯著，顯示事故的發生多出現於成立時間較短的航空公司，此一結果證實成立時間較久的航空公司可能因累積的飛行經驗較豐富，也因此使得飛安事故發生的可能性較低。和Rose(1990)所提及的航空公司累積的營運經驗也許可降低風險，或依賴較有經驗的機組人員會減少人員疏失的頻率以增加安全性的主張相同。 若以資本額新台幣200億元作為區隔，則分群結果發現，較小規模的航空公司可能因自有資金較為不足，財務結構較弱，飛安受到影響至為明顯，此一結果證實過去文獻(Rose 1990)所提及的小型航空公司較易遭遇意外事件；此外，固定資產週轉率愈低，即使用效率愈低，飛安受到影響的可能性愈大。就分群結果可發現：成立時間的長短與資本額是否超過200億元在檢定上具有顯著攸關性。 另外，以Chang et al. (2000)所提整體協和比率及邊際協和比率方法，並經適度修正後來評估航空公司財務表現的排名。則結果發現：各年度航空公司的財務表現排名順序不一，飛安事件發生頻率亦呈現不規則的變化。以八十三年資料為例，中華、長榮、立榮、華信、國華、復興、瑞聯及遠東的短期償債能力平均排名值分別為3.00, 6.50, 6.50, 1.00, 7.33, 5.67, 2.00及4.00，邊際協合比率分別為100%, 78.57%, 78.57%, 100%, 85.71%, 85.71%, 100% 與100%，短期償債能力的整體協合比率則為91.07%。以邊際協合比率加權計算各構面之綜合平均值求整個年度的整體表現，各業者分別為3.22, 6.03, 6.16, 2.69, 4.11, 3.86, 6.80與2.78，平均整體協合比率則為90.71%。綜合平均值之整體協合比率高達90.71﹪，可充份表達八十三年各航空公司的財務表現。表現最佳的為華信，遠東次之，中華第三，接著分別為復興、國華、長榮、立榮，瑞聯表現則居末。然而整體而言，財務表現排名較佳的航空公司其飛安事件發生次數較少，同時財務表現排名較弱的航空公司亦未顯見飛安事件次數的遞增。而是財務表現排名居中的航空公司飛安記錄較差。 若將時間拉長，以連續五年的記錄觀察各航空公司的整體表現，整體協合比率平均值為91.07%，整體的排名結果可將航空公司財務表現分為較佳及較弱的兩個群體，較佳的為遠東、華信、中華、長榮，較弱的為復興、國華、立榮、瑞聯。此可顯示就財務表現而言，大致呈現一個固定的分群，各公司財務表現排名順序僅在各群中小幅變動，財務表現事實上尚稱穩定。且發現財務表現較弱的這一群的失事率及事故發生率，較財務表現較佳的這一分群為高，此可印證財務健全與飛航安全的一致性。且與攸關性實證的結果作一呼應，財務表現較佳的航空公司其平均負債比率較低，而財務表現較弱的航空公司其平均負債比率較高，且有逐年增加的趨勢。

Previous literature, including Rose (1990), Dionne et al. (1997) and Singal (1998), demonstrated that financial indicators were correlated with airline safety. For example, Rose (1990) used data on 35 large scheduled passenger airlines over the 1957-1986 period to estimate the effect of profitability and other aspects of financial health on accident and incident rates. The results indicated that lower profitability is correlated with higher accident and incident rates, particular for smaller carriers. In order to meet the changes in demand of Taiwan aerial market structure, to protect the airline safety, and to promote the development of air transportation, the “Open Sky Policy” had been executed in 1987. More passenger seats, more aerial routes, and more airlines had been provided for customer choices since then. The airline market has been therefore changed a lot. Firstly, the ownership were shifted quite often during the period from 1994 to 1998 mainly due to merger, acquisition, and sold-out under poor operation. Secondly, the strategic alliances had been formed among different airlines. Different airlines applied code sharing and ticket sharing to enhance the service scope and to reduce the cost. Thirdly, the airline safety became worse which showed a warning sign for Taiwan aero transportation. During this period, several airplane crashes occurred. Passengers lose their confidence for aero transportation safety. According to the IATA statistics, the global accident rate was 0.818 per million flight hours from 1988 to 1997 in average. Unfortunately, it was 3.0 in Taiwan during the same time period. The airline safety level was far behind the global level. Under the changing environment of the global aerial market, the connection between the financial health and the airline safety is worth discussing. Poisson regression model is used to test the connection. The study also uses OCOR and MOR developed by Chang et al. (2000) and modified by this study to investigate the changes of financial performance in order to evaluate the financial performance of airlines. The results are then employed to compare with the airline safety records. Our purpose is to observe the consistency of financial performance and airline safety. If certain relationship could be concluded, the financial performance could be applied as a good reference indicator to airline safety. The study is a little different from the previous literature that emphasized the aspect of profitability. From the Poisson regression results of relevance analysis, the model shows that debt ratio was correlated with the accident and incident rate simultaneously with a significant effect. The higher the debt ratio, the more possible mishaps occur. It shows that capital structure may be an appropriate financial health indicator for airline safety. Taken the history into consideration, the results show that debt ratio was significant for airlines that set up less than ten years. For the airlines that existed less than ten years, the higher the debt ratio, the more possible incidents may happen. The effect did not appear for the longer history airlines. It confirmed that airlines relied on more experienced personnel to decrease the frequency of human error or an airline’s cumulative operating experience may reduce its risk (Rose 1990). Moreover, considering the effect of capital scale, the smaller carriers displayed a worse but significant result. It was also sure that the smaller carriers may be easier to get mishaps like the results of previous studies (Rose 1990). The consistency results of OCOR and MOR (Chang et al. 2000) showed that by there was no obvious relationship between financial performance and the accident rate or incident rate in 1994. From the data of 1994, the average rankings of short-term liquidity are 3.00, 6.50, 6.50, 1.00, 7.33, 5.67, 2.00, and 4.00, and the MOR are 100%, 78.57%, 78.57%, 100%, 85.71%, 85.71%, 100%, and 100% for CA, EVA, Uni Mandarin, Formosa, TransAsia, U-Land, and FAT. The OCOR of short-term liquidity is 91.07% in 1993. Weighted by each dimension’s MOR, the average ranking of the whole year is 3.22, 6.03, 6.16, 2.69, 4.11, 3.86, 6.80, and 2.78. The OCOR of the whole year is 90.71%. The OCOR is high enough to represent the financial performance of airlines in 1994. Therefore, the best financially performed airline is Mandarin, and FAT is the second. The rest are CA, TransAsia, Formosa, EVA and Uni. U-Land is the worst one. The best financially performed airline and the worst financially performed airline had fewer, even zero bad safety records. The safety problems happened in the middle financially performed airlines. Some information was observed from the results of cumulative five-year observation. On one hand, there seemed no specific relationship between the financial performance and the airline safety from individual observation annually. On the other hand, if we divided the airlines into two groups from the data of the continuous years, the better one and the worse one, it was found that the first four airlines were FAT, CA, Mandarin and EVA. They performed better financially. The last four airlines were TransAsia, Formosa, Uni, and U-Land. They performed worse financially. From the divided group analysis, it confirmed the consistency of financial health and airline safety.