BOT垃圾資源回收廠最低營收保證價值之研究

Abstract

對於具有高度風險的BOT投資計畫，政府必須給予特許公司額外的獎勵措施才能吸引民間參與，因為傳統淨現值法無法確實衡量企業在決策上的管理彈性，所以本研究嘗試以實質選擇權觀點出發，選取烏日垃圾資源回收廠為例，計算可能潛藏的彈性價值，其中包括放棄選擇權、最低營收保證選擇權和複合選擇權的價值。研究結果顯示，應用選擇權評價模式可以得到投資計畫的真正價值，避免低估的情況發生；此外，當特許公司同時擁有兩種以上的選擇權時，總彈性價值將會小於個別評價之和。

Since BOT projects involve substantial risks, government must afford the chartered companies some extra incentives which can attract private institutes’ participation. Due to static NPV method that cannot correctly estimate the managerial flexibility for company decisions, this study is trying to apply “Real Option” theory into Wujih Refuse Incineration Plant by calculating the potential value of managerial flexibility, which consists of the value of abandoning options, options which guarantee minimum revenues and compound options. The findings of this research show that the real option pricing model can not only accurately estimate the intrinsic value of projects, but also prevent from underestimating the real value of projects. In addition, when the chartered companies hold more than two options at the same time, total flexibility value will be less than the sum of individual options due to the interaction between each option.