集團股權結構的決定因素與影響： 產業關聯、內部資本市場

Abstract

集團控股型態普遍地存在於世界各國，在各經濟體扮演相當重要的角色。控制股東透過金字塔與交叉持股，直接或間接地掌握整個集團的控制權；然而複雜的股權結構，導致控制股東的所有權與控制權偏離程度變大，引發代理問題，成為當今公司治理重要的議題（La Porta et al., 1999;Bebchuk et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002）。但是，金字塔結構有可能是集團企業最佳籌資選擇下的結果，透過內部資本市場，讓對外籌資不易的公司可以較低的成本取得資金，這樣的優勢在投資人保護程度低的國家顯得更有價值。而且企業間的金字塔或交叉持股，通常是持久且對公司價值提昇有幫助，特別是當企業間為產業合作夥伴時（Allen and Phillips, 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Almeida et al., 2011；Masulis et al., 2011; Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013）。 有鑑於上述不一樣的看法，我們以台灣的集團企業為研究對象，重新審視集團股權結構形成之決定因素與影響。本文的集團企業定義是至少包含兩家上市上櫃公司之集團，分別蒐集2012年與2007年的集團股權結構資料，計算集團旗下上市上櫃公司被控制股東直接持股比例、被金字塔持股比例，以及被交叉持股比例，再透過此三種股權結構整理出集團旗下上市上櫃公司在金字塔結構中的層級，並以CENTRAL變數衡量公司在集團內的重要性，其代表集團的主要控制公司（在集團內直間接控有的公司數÷集團總公司數）。本文的樣本於2012年有176個集團、544家上市上櫃公司，2007年有150個集團、454家上市上櫃公司。我們以集團股權結構與關係人銷貨、進貨的關係來探討集團旗下上市上櫃公司的產業上下游關聯性，並以及集團股權結構、關係人資金往來與背書保證來衡量集團內部資本市場。 實證結果顯示，被金字塔持股較高的公司，未來的績效較好；而控制越多集團內其他企業（CENTRAL）的公司，未來的績效較差。在金字塔結構中，集團運作的方式為下層企業對上層企業銷貨，而上層企業則向下層企業進貨，代表台灣集團發展多為向後垂直整合。另外，被控制股東直接持股高、被交叉持股多的企業，在集團內部資本市場中，扮演資金提供者與替下層公司背書保證的角色。綜合上述，集團的形成提供了內部資本市場與產業垂直整合。此外，實證結果並未發現被交叉持股高的公司對績效有顯著負面的影響。 而探討過去績效表現、關係人交易狀況對股權結構之影響，發現控制股東可能因為集團內被控制股東直接持股高、CENTRAL高的公司成長趨緩，或者為了鞏固產業競爭優勢欲進行垂直整合，而轉投資其他公司以求獲利或降低成本。在控制股東不願意承擔太多風險時，他們可能不會本人直接投資，而是利用主要控股公司的既有資源，對高成長性的企業或原料供應商進行金字塔持股，提高集團內運作效率。

Groups of firms under common ownership are prevalent around the world. These so-called business groups accounts for a large fraction of the economic activity of many countries. It is common for controlling shareholders of the group to enhance control by pyramidal structure and cross-shareholdings. However, these control-enhancing mechanisms lead to a wedge between cash flow and control right, which can encourage expropriation of minority shareholders by ultimate controller through various tunneling. While some recent studies have explored that the motivation to create pyramidal structure is for the significant financing advantage by leverage a group’s internal capital market. According to different viewpoints above, the main purpose of this study is to examine the determinants and effects of ownership structure by using the sample of Taiwan’s listed group firms. The study takes into consideration the three different ownerships in the group firm: ultimate controller’s direct shareholdings, pyramids, and cross-shareholdings. Then, we investigate the relation between ownership structures and performances as well as related party transactions in the past and future of group firms. The results show that firms with high ownerships retained by other affiliated firms within the group will outperform in the future. While the central firms which control more affiliated firms will have lower performance. And through the related party transactions, we find the top firms or central firms lend more money to affiliated firms and guarantee for them. It indicates that the working of internal capital market in the group benefits bottom firms and provide them more growth opportunities. Also, we find the industrial linkage within the pyramidal structure. Bottom firms tends to sell product to their parent(s) and top firms tends to purchase from bottom, which imply groups may form pyramidal structure for reaching the advantage of reducing the cost by internal supply chain vertical integration. For these reason and results, pyramids may not be created for tunneling, while for advantages of internal capital market and industrial integration. Besides, in this study, there has no negative effect been found on cross-shareholding.