标题: 集团股权结构的决定因素与影响: 产业关联、内部资本市场
Determinants and Effects of Ownership Structure in Business Groups: Industrial Linkage and Internal Capital Market
作者: 吴念容
叶银华
周幼珍
财务金融研究所
关键字: 集团;股权结构;内部资本市场;金字塔持股;产业关联;关系人交易;Business Group;Ownership Structure;Internal Capital Market;Pyramids;Industrial Linkage;Related Party Transactions
公开日期: 2013
摘要: 集团控股型态普遍地存在于世界各国,在各经济体扮演相当重要的角色。控制股东透过金字塔与交叉持股,直接或间接地掌握整个集团的控制权;然而复杂的股权结构,导致控制股东的所有权与控制权偏离程度变大,引发代理问题,成为当今公司治理重要的议题(La Porta et al., 1999;Bebchuk et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002)。但是,金字塔结构有可能是集团企业最佳筹资选择下的结果,透过内部资本市场,让对外筹资不易的公司可以较低的成本取得资金,这样的优势在投资人保护程度低的国家显得更有价值。而且企业间的金字塔或交叉持股,通常是持久且对公司价值提升有帮助,特别是当企业间为产业合作夥伴时(Allen and Phillips, 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Almeida et al., 2011;Masulis et al., 2011; Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013)。
有鉴于上述不一样的看法,我们以台湾的集团企业为研究对象,重新审视集团股权结构形成之决定因素与影响。本文的集团企业定义是至少包含两家上市上柜公司之集团,分别搜集2012年与2007年的集团股权结构资料,计算集团旗下上市上柜公司被控制股东直接持股比例、被金字塔持股比例,以及被交叉持股比例,再透过此三种股权结构整理出集团旗下上市上柜公司在金字塔结构中的层级,并以CENTRAL变数衡量公司在集团内的重要性,其代表集团的主要控制公司(在集团内直间接控有的公司数÷集团总公司数)。本文的样本于2012年有176个集团、544家上市上柜公司,2007年有150个集团、454家上市上柜公司。我们以集团股权结构与关系人销货、进货的关系来探讨集团旗下上市上柜公司的产业上下游关联性,并以及集团股权结构、关系人资金往来与背书保证来衡量集团内部资本市场。
实证结果显示,被金字塔持股较高的公司,未来的绩效较好;而控制越多集团内其他企业(CENTRAL)的公司,未来的绩效较差。在金字塔结构中,集团运作的方式为下层企业对上层企业销货,而上层企业则向下层企业进货,代表台湾集团发展多为向后垂直整合。另外,被控制股东直接持股高、被交叉持股多的企业,在集团内部资本市场中,扮演资金提供者与替下层公司背书保证的角色。综合上述,集团的形成提供了内部资本市场与产业垂直整合。此外,实证结果并未发现被交叉持股高的公司对绩效有显着负面的影响。
而探讨过去绩效表现、关系人交易状况对股权结构之影响,发现控制股东可能因为集团内被控制股东直接持股高、CENTRAL高的公司成长趋缓,或者为了巩固产业竞争优势欲进行垂直整合,而转投资其他公司以求获利或降低成本。在控制股东不愿意承担太多风险时,他们可能不会本人直接投资,而是利用主要控股公司的既有资源,对高成长性的企业或原料供应商进行金字塔持股,提高集团内运作效率。
Groups of firms under common ownership are prevalent around the world. These so-called business groups accounts for a large fraction of the economic activity of many countries. It is common for controlling shareholders of the group to enhance control by pyramidal structure and cross-shareholdings. However, these control-enhancing mechanisms lead to a wedge between cash flow and control right, which can encourage expropriation of minority shareholders by ultimate controller through various tunneling. While some recent studies have explored that the motivation to create pyramidal structure is for the significant financing advantage by leverage a group’s internal capital market. According to different viewpoints above, the main purpose of this study is to examine the determinants and effects of ownership structure by using the sample of Taiwan’s listed group firms.
The study takes into consideration the three different ownerships in the group firm: ultimate controller’s direct shareholdings, pyramids, and cross-shareholdings. Then, we investigate the relation between ownership structures and performances as well as related party transactions in the past and future of group firms. The results show that firms with high ownerships retained by other affiliated firms within the group will outperform in the future. While the central firms which control more affiliated firms will have lower performance. And through the related party transactions, we find the top firms or central firms lend more money to affiliated firms and guarantee for them. It indicates that the working of internal capital market in the group benefits bottom firms and provide them more growth opportunities.
Also, we find the industrial linkage within the pyramidal structure. Bottom firms tends to sell product to their parent(s) and top firms tends to purchase from bottom, which imply groups may form pyramidal structure for reaching the advantage of reducing the cost by internal supply chain vertical integration. For these reason and results, pyramids may not be created for tunneling, while for advantages of internal capital market and industrial integration. Besides, in this study, there has no negative effect been found on cross-shareholding.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT070053919
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/74672
显示于类别:Thesis