民間參與公共建設特許談判談判權力之研究

Abstract

公共建設關係著國家經濟的發展以及人民生活品質的提升，然近年來政府經常性支出大量增加，使得大規模的公共建設計畫遭遇財政困難而難以推行。因此政府積極推動民間參與公共建設，並透過BOT（興建-營運-移轉）模式，運用特許競標機制，將公共建設之財產權轉移予民間特許公司，並以引進民間單位的資金與經營效率。 實際上民間參與公共建設在特許談判階段的過程中常面臨一些實務問題，其經常面臨之問題包括︰(1)工程細部規劃、設計資料缺乏與不確定因素多；(2)參與談判各方對目標及風險分派之認知差異；(3)政府與民間特許競標團隊談判經驗不足；(4)議約談判期限短且倉促等。本研究將上述問題對於談判的影響分為談判議題資訊、資源與議題需完成之時間壓力，並定義談判權力與三者因素之關係，探討當談判雙方的談判權力不對等時，其各自會有不同的策略考量進而影響談判行為，最終也將影響各自的談判效用。 本研究之目的在於探討當政府與特許競標團隊在特許契約議約談判過程中，當政府與特許競標團隊的談判權力隨時間變動時，對於談判雙方在談判效用上有何不同程度的影響。將談判權力的特性導入並定義成函數，再運用「賽局理論」模擬當談判權力變動之下，求得其對於政府與特許競標團隊的特許契約談判協商過程中有何影響，且加入案例分析探討雙方在不同談判權力互動下對於各自談判效用的變化。本研究冀望分析當談判雙方在不同談判權力的情境之下，可利用各自談判效用的變化以求得各自的最佳策略，以避免談判雙方因談判時間的流失而致使談判雙方效用消失殆盡，並可供政府與特許競標團隊在相關特許契約談判時應用。

The public infrastructure project has huge influence on resident’s living quality and national economic development. In recent years, government encountered the challenge of financial retrenchment when execute important infrastructure projects, because of the increasing of regularly expenditure. To resolve this problem, the government is encouraging the public participation in infrastructure investment by means of the competitive mechanism called concession-contract Build-Operate-Transfer model. It can transfer the public property right to private competitive companies and induce the financial and operating efficiency from these participants. It exists a set of partical problems on concession-contract negotiation between the government and the participants for the infrastructure projects. These problems include the lack of detailed information about the design and architecture, the gap of recognition about the project's objective and risk distribution and the lack for experience and time of negotiation. In this research, the impact of these problems are categorized as three major parts: the information, resource and the time pressure of the targeting issue. The relationship among the negotiating power and the major parts are definited also. It will deeply influence the process and the outcomes of the negotiation from variety of negotiating power, strategies and behavior among the disputants and result in different influence on each side's negotiation effects. This research will try to capture the concession negotiation process and possible interactive responses of BOT contracting parties in game-theoretic models. Analyzing the influence on process and outcomes of concession-contract negotiation by capture the variability of bargaining power and time preference. The resulting models would enable a better understanding of the BOT concession negotiation process and provide some guidelines for contracting parties.