債券到期期間結構與盈餘管理行為之關聯性

Abstract

過去研究舉債融資策略的學者們，已經藉由透過許多不同的假說理論，彰顯出債券到期期間決策的重要性。而近年來的研究則另外強調，當公司管理者和股東之間的利益出現歧異時，對公司發行債券之到期期間也會造成影響。本篇文章目的在於探討當公司管理者進行盈餘管理的動作，是否對於債券到期期間長短的選擇有所影響。本論文以初次公開發行上市的公司為研究樣本，並且認定債券到期期間和負債兩者為同時決定的內生變數。實證結果發現公司管理者的盈餘管理行為確實影響公司公開上市一年後所發行債券之到期期間長短的選擇。在初次公開發行時，盈餘管理行為的程度越嚴重的公司，將會有愈強的意圖去發行到期期間較長的債券，以規避頻繁的外部監督和重複發行短期債券的高成本。

Researchers of debt financing policies have already shown the importance of debt maturity by means of different hypotheses. Recent research emphasizes that the discrepancy of interests between managers and shareholders also influences debt maturity choice. The aim of this article attempts to explore how the corporate debt maturity structure changes in terms of the manager’s behavior of earnings management. Using initial public offerings (IPOs) firms as the sample and modeling debt maturity and leverage determined endogenously and simultaneously, we conclude that manager’s behavior of earnings management causes subsequent larger portion of long-maturity debt issued in the following year after IPOs. Managers of aggressive firms in the period of IPOs have the incentive to lengthen the maturity of corporate debt hereafter in order to prevent frequent monitoring by the market and higher issuing cost for rolling over short-maturity debt.