跨國綠色供應鍊合作協議談判架構與模型之研究

Abstract

隨著國際環保意識的抬頭及政府、環保團體等第三勢力的逐漸介入下，「綠色供應鍊」 中主要成員，包括製造商及逆物流商之間的互動與合作便成為落實「延伸企業社會責 任」及「綠色供應鍊管理」不可避免的重要課題，而此議題自歐盟實施WEEE、RoHS 等法案後，所衍生之國際高科技廠商與第三方逆物流商之間的跨國談判，進行協同合 作，以確保符合當地環保規範，便儼然成為學術及實務最重要的相關課題。有鑑於此， 本計畫擬提為 3 年期研究計畫，期能在第1 年期中，先用「非對稱式Nash 談判賽局」 理論，構建一3 層式跨國綠色供應鍊談判架構，其中並將針對談判成員雙方之談判風 險及面對其他競爭對手之競價策略等不確定性一併考量；於第2 年期中，將進一步整 合資訊不對稱之動態賽局及修正式連續機率比測試等方法論，構建一適用於處理綠色 供應鍊成員中談判雙方為彼此長期合作契約之機制設計並求解；進而於第3 年期計畫 中，將綠色消費者之行為影響加以考量，並與原「綠色供應鍊談判模式」整合，並提 出有效「綠色行銷－供應鍊管理」之整合性策略。

As the global environmental issues emerge along with the involvement of governmental influences by means of green legislations and financial instruments (e.g., green taxation and subsidy), interactions between producers and reverse logistics suppliers (termed RL-supplier for short) are unavoidable in green supply chains before reaching the condition of cooperative synergism. Therefore, I intend to propose a 3-year research proposal to investigate the problem of negotiations between producers and RL-suppliers in oligopoly competition contexts under the influence of governmental take-back legislations and financial instruments. In the 1st-year project, I plan to propose a bargaining framework to formulate the aforementioned producer-RL-supplier negotiation problems in competing green supply chains. Particularly, a three-stage game-based model is formulated to seek for the equilibrium solutions of competing green supply chains. Stage 1 conceptualizes the government’s objective by maximizing the social welfare to determine the optimal solutions of green taxes and subsidies. This is followed by the use of asymmetric Nash bargaining game with uncertainties of reservation prices, expected profits and breakdown risks from outside options to seek for negotiation solutions of green supply chains in Stage 2, and determine production quantities in Stage 3. Based on the derived results, I would like to extend the proposed Nash bargaining game model for the investigation of a more complicated case: long-term contract design for the sustainability of green supply chain cooperation using dynamic games with incomplete information. Therein, I plan to incorporate the technology of modified-generalized sequential probability ratio tests (M-GSPRT) into a dynamic game model to address the above issue. This is followed by the 3rd-year project aiming at the integration with green consumer behavior modeling with the proposed green supply chain cooperation model to characterize the effect of green consumer behavior on green supply chain management (GSCM)