第三方利益團體介入政府鄰避性建設賽局之研究

Abstract

鄰避性的公共建設雖說最終目的是達成所有公民的公共利益，但在執行時，如同其他類型的政府公共建設一般，受到一部分的人支持，但是往往也會有反對者的出現。此外，相關涉及政府與民眾的量化談判賽局研究可說是少之又少。 本研究的主要貢獻為架構一量化之政府與民間鄰避性建設談判機制，並探討不同類型的第三方利益團體加入後對談判結構的影響。求解方法為利用賽局理論中Rubinstein的談判出價概念，求出不同時間序列時賽局參賽者的提議值後，再將臨避性建設的特性及談判權力函數導入，最後求出談判雙方的最佳提議值。試圖瞭解民眾與政府談判期間，談判權力的變化及談判底限值對於整體談判結構的影響和結果的改變。同時也探討利益團體介入談判前後，分別對談判雙方的影響及進行敏感度分析。 研究分析結果顯示，在影響談判權力的因素中，談判者對議題的參與程度最為重要，佔整體談判權力結構的29.5%，其次依序為時間對雙方的談判壓力(28.4%)、雙方掌握的資訊程度(25.8%)、雙方對標的物的依賴程度(16.2%)。而在雙方的談判利益方面，研究結果指出第三方利益團體未加入談判前，政府的底限值愈嚴格或民眾的底限值愈寬鬆，則雙方的利益皆會變大，且利益增加的幅度政府較民眾方大；第三方團體加入後，無論該團體屬性為何，參賽者的利益與第三方團體的屬性不具線性關係，且第三方利益團體底線值的結構將對原先談判兩造的利益產生指數性影響。

The Not In My Back Yard(NIMBY) case, is to ultimately realize the citizen profits as all the other governmental constructions do. However, it cannot meet everyone’s expectations, not all the citizen are in favor of government’s policy. Besides, the relative quantitative research of the bargaining game between government and citizen is much rare. This article mainly contributes to construct an quantitative bargaining system of NIMBY between government and citizen, and discuss the affects of different third interest groups(TIG)’ intervention on model’s stucture. This model is constructed on the base of Rubinstein bargaining concept. Firstly, we compute player’s offer in different time sequence. And then, by inputting the characteristics of NIMBY as well as bargaining power function, we try to obtain the best offer of both sides. Besides, the thesis also aims to study the relationship between bargaining power and original offer, limit value, the whole bargaining structure, and the final banlance offer. Finally, we also do the sensitivity analysis. Analytical results shows that within those factors affecting bargaining power, players’ interest into the issue is the most important one, taking up 29.5% in the whole bargainin structure. Accordingly, time pressure occupying 28.4%, available information 25.8%, dependence on objects 16.2%. Through further research and analysis, the thesis gives bargaining solution as follows, that without TIG’s intervention, profits of both players get large (government gains profit more than citizen) when government reduce its limit value or citizen increase its limit value. After the TIG participates into originally bilateral bargaining, whatever its value is, no lineral relation between its value and players’ profits exist, but the limit value of both players do matter instead. The limit value will cause the exponential effect of profit on both sides.