雙占市場下實質選擇權與經理人薪酬

Abstract

本篇文章以實質選擇權模型探討雙占公司中經理人投資、融資決策與代理問題，分別討論公司、股東與經理人所作的最適投資與融資決策，以及不同經理人薪酬對於經理人是否有搶先投資行為或舉債與否，其中經理人之薪酬參數包括保留收入、先前薪資、固定薪資與持有股份比率。相較Zhdanov (2008)文獻，不僅在雙占市場下討論Firm-Best決策，我們亦加入討論並比較 Equity-Best 與 Manager-Best所作的的最適投資與融資決策，而相較Anderikopoulos (2009)文獻，我們則是討論雙占市場中先投資者的搶先行為對經理人最適融資與投資決策的影響，故此篇文章可以提供將來設計雙占市場中經理人薪資所需資訊。

This paper employs a real option model to investigate managers’ investment and financing decisions and agency conflicts in duopoly, where the manager’s expected wealth includes fixed salary, ownership shares, and previous/reservation incomes. We analyze three cases in which the optimal investment and financing decisions are made by the firm, shareholders and manager, respectively. Complement to Zhdanov (2008), we particularly demonstrate that the optimal investment and financing decisions of Firm-Best, Equity-Best and Manager-Best are significantly different from each other in duopoly. Moreover, compared with Anderikopoulos (2009), we specifically show how the preemptive investment of the leader plays a crucial role in managers’ optimal investment and financing decisions in duopoly. The model’s results can be applied to the design of optimal managerial compensation in duopoly.