智慧財產權制度設計之交易成本分析

Abstract

在法定智慧財產權的技術知識產權中,專利相較於營業秘密,有著兩大相對誘因:以公開宣示產權範圍及以公權力介入侵權糾紛處置的方式,分攤創新技術知識擁有者所面臨之剽竊風險與產權護衛等成本來源(降低產權持有成本);再者,經由將技術知識要項內容公開傳佈流通的過程,提昇創新技術知識持有者實現其利益之成功機率(提高產權持有之預期利益). 專利能以要約型式包裝完整的(技術)契約內容;專利持有者同時能獲得要約公開的好處,並仍能享有營業秘密對核心技術機密的保護效力.因而如何持續強化專利的誘因,吸引創新技術知識以專利型式持有,以獲取公共技術資產積累致使錯誤研發減少及誘發研發增加的效益,乃是專利制度設計之首要前提. 專利產權的頒發並不會造成一般所謂的市場銷售性"獨占",反而將因造成技術能力的"部份性獨占"現象促使市場競爭加劇,以期消除此一相對優勢;整體市場將朝向多元化均衡的態勢演進,供給與需求兩線的價格彈性將趨於鈍化,使得透過交易所生之利得亦隨之擴增.這與完全競爭市場上注重以價格破壞作為創造部份性獨占優勢之籌碼,而使得偏高的價格彈性降低了市場創新能力的本質截然不同,是一個市場良性發展的較佳模式. 本文基於降低產權持有之交易(風險)成本與增加產權預期利得兩項考量,提出一些現行專利行政與訴訟業務的改革方針建議,期能為各界參照.

This study is primarily concerned with the design and functions of the patent systems. The transaction cost theory is utilized as the approach to analyze the arguments and practices in several respects. This paper concludes that the patent systems are distinguished from the trade secrets at least in two aspects : (1)The patent systems protect the ownership of intangible property rights with the formatted and stated claim scope, which may also lead to the settlement of patent infringement with lower transaction costs. (2)The patent systems facilitate a valuable database of technology information and an accessible market to escalate the opportunities of technology transactions. Instead of exerting the monopolistic power to the markets, patents actually create limited technological monopoly, which may make a market more competitive and reach the state of multi-dimensional equilibrium. The neoclassical theory of the complete competitive market,that applies price competition to create competitive advantages, will result in lower welfare by decreasing the incentives of investments on the innovative activities of firms. Compared to the complete competitive market, the patent systems that grant technological ownership would provide a better path for the market development in the long run.