不同產業競爭度下，股權誘因對經理人激勵行為之研究

Abstract

本論文以產業競爭角度來探討股票薪酬對經理人行為產生的誘因關係。過去文獻普遍聚焦於股票薪酬誘使經理人進行盈餘管理，本論文認為，股權誘因的強度會受到產業競爭度對公司獲利空間與經營決策的影響。股票薪酬比例增加時，經理人透過盈餘管理影響公司股價，藉此取得更高的薪酬，而產業競爭壓力排擠股票薪酬產生的誘因效果。本論文以產業競爭度作分群探討，發現此誘因關係隨著產業競爭度增加而減弱，在趨近完全競爭產業時，經理人的盈餘管理為反應競爭壓力並非為追求高報酬，原因來自於產業競爭度作為公司外部監督機制，競爭壓力與有限的獲利空間減少了經理人的私利行為。而股票薪酬仍能透過激勵經理人達到分析師預期盈餘，作為降低與股東之間利益衝突的有效機制。

This paper adds a new dimension to the managerial incentives literature by establishing a link between product market competition and the impact of equity incentives to managerial behavior. Managers with high equity incentives engage in higher level of earnings management, in order to influence firm's stock price and bolster their compensation. Nevertheless, we derive a notion that competition has dominant impact on the strength of equity incentive to managerial behavior. Competition decrease managers' private benefit behavior, while treat of liquidation increase firms' need of earnings management. Although equity incentives bring a new set of problems, it still a helpful tool of aligning interest of mangers and shareholders by pushing managers to meet or beat analyst forecast.