國際投資法上合理規制措施之研究-以間接徵收規範為中心

Abstract

自冷戰結束以來，國際投資條約與國際投資仲裁數量有了爆炸性的成長。時至今日，全世界已有接近3000個雙邊投資協定，與其他區域性的多邊投資協定，構成了國際投資法綿密的規範架構，也使得國際投資法成為國際經濟法中相當重要的領域。國際投資條約是為了提供外國投資更優良的保障而簽訂的，地主國透過投資條約之簽訂，降低投資人的風險，進而吸引更多外國投資進入。透過條約的簽訂，地主國放棄了一部分其在國際法上一般享有的對內規制權限，即主權國家同意其對內權利的行使，必須合乎條約的規範。 但即使投資人的母國與地主國訂有投資條約，投資人與地主國間的爭端有時仍難以避免，此時就必須判斷國家作為是否違反條約的義務。在國際法上，一般承認國家仍享有一定的規制權限，而規制權限的行使尚在合理範圍時，即使造成投資人的損害也不需要補償。參與投資條約固然對規制權限造成的一定的限制，但投資條約並非意在消滅所有不須補償的規制措施，故在投資條約下，何時規制措施需要補償，即為投資爭端的一大爭議。此種爭議在投資人主張地主國違反間接徵收規範時尤其劇烈。本文透過文獻分析、內國法與其他國際法庭的判例整理、國際投資條約以及國際投資仲裁案例分析，就間接徵收規範與國家規制權限的衝突問題，加以探討。 在研究中發現較早期的投資條約中，欠缺對間接徵收與國家合理規制權限的區分，也沒有提供兩者定義，因此只能依賴仲裁庭的解釋。近期的條約則提供了一些參考要素，並且明示國家有規制權限，提供了較高的確定性及利益間的衡平性，但是對於這些要素的運用方式，仍有賴仲裁庭加以具體化。然而，眾多的間接徵收案例中，仲裁庭區分合理規制措施與間接徵收的方式，卻有很大的差異；此外，間接徵收案例中對於地主國以及投資人雙方的權利平衡，似亦未仔細斟酌。雖然近期新的投資條約中，締約國透過條約的定義加強了因此本文提出一套判斷模式，以改善上述確定性跟衡平性上的缺失。

Since the end of cold war, the numbers of investment treaties and investment arbitrations have increased significantly. Nowadays there are nearly 3000 bilateral investment treaties along with several regional investment treaties. These treaties are designed to attract foreign investors by providing favorable investment environment. Through the conclusion of investment treaties, the host states agree to give up part of their sovereign, to guarantee the regulatory power will be exercised in accordance with the treaty. However, the investment treaties do not eliminate dispute between investors and host states. When disputes raise, how much regulatory power the host states remaining becomes the most important issue. In the public international law, the sovereign states have their inherent right to regulate domestic affairs including economic activities. As long as the states do not abuse the right to regulate, there would be no obligation to compensate incurred, even the state activities harm the assets of foreign investors. Although joining investment treaties limit the right to regulate, the treaties do not intend to eliminate all the non-compensable regulatory spaces for the host state. The key issue then becomes how much can the state regulates before infringing the treaties obligation. This issue is especially important when the investors raise indirect expropriation claims against the host state. This article tries to depict how this issue been considered in indirect expropriation cases under international investment law and further examine the approach taken by the current international investment law. By examining the developments of investment treaties and investment disputes on indirect expropriation, this article addresses that: 1). Traditional treaties provide very few clues on how to distinguish indirect expropriation and reasonable exercise of regulatory power that does not incur compensation. Though recent treaties have made some progress by providing factors to be considered the content of these factors and the order to examine them still rely on the interpretation of arbitral tribunal. 2). Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunals’ interpretation is not always consistent. Although most of the tribunals admit that the states have certain regulatory spaces, the tribunals’ approaches seem not very coherent on how to distinguish indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory activities. At the same time, the arbitral awards often do not balance the interest of both investors and host states. After examining the current situation of indirect expropriation cases and identifying the aforementioned flaws, in the last part of this article, a proposal is made to fix the flaws: 1). Establish a coherent examination structure in expropriation cases; 2). Use proportionality as a tool to balance the interests of investor and the host states.