新興市場內部公司治理機制之替代效果與互補效果分析

Abstract

自2002年以降，獨立董監制度已在台灣部分實施五年。自2007開始，獨立董監制度將在台灣上市公司全面實施。年本論文從過去五年來獨立董監制度與其他內部公司治理機制間之交互關係審視其效力及效率。研究結果有三：第一，董事會獨立性、本國法人持股、與外資法人持股皆與公司之價值有正向關係。第二，獨立董監與本國法人持股之監督效果為替代關係、而獨立董監與外資法人持股之監督效果為互補關係，且雙重完善公司治理機制之價值效果大於單一完善公司治理機制之價值效果。第三，公司治理機制間之交互關係與公司特性相關，其中互補作用在規模較小之公司或舉債較少之公司較為顯著，而替代關係在規模較大之公司或舉債較多之公司較為顯著。本論文之啟示為，多重公司治理未必對所有公司皆為最適安排，對於公司治理機制之間替代作用較為顯著之公司而言，可能適合集中資源強化單一公司治理機制，避免造成多項公司治理機制之效力重複而成本浪費；而對於公司治理機制之間互補作用較為顯著之公司而言，可能適合分散資源於多重公司治理使其達到互補效果。

Independent director has been partially enforced in Taiwan for 5 years and is about to instituted thoroughly. This thesis examines the effectiveness and efficiency of independent director in Taiwanese corporate governance system by investigating how it interacts with other internal governance mechanisms, including domestic institutional investor and foreign institutional investor. The result acknowledges the positive valuation effect of independent director, as well as domestic institutional investor and foreign institutional investor, and finds that the governance effect of independent director substitutes the effect of domestic institutional investor and complements the effect of foreign institutional investor. Moreover, the interactions between internal governance mechanisms depend on firm characteristics. The substitution effect exists in large or high-leveraged firms while the complementary effect exists in small or low-leveraged firms. The implication of this research is that multiple governance mechanism is not necessarily optimal for every firm. For some firms it might be better to concentrate their resources in refining a single governance mechanism, while for others, it is more beneficial to diversify into many governance mechanisms with complementary effects.