非對稱雙占市場下實質選擇權與經理人薪酬

Abstract

本篇文章建立不對稱的雙占實質選擇權模型，研究兩家公司經理人在不同固定薪資和持股比例下，對投資決策和融資決策之影響。當公司經理人負責決策時，兩家公司的投資與融資決策之差別主要歸因於下列三種因素：第一，兩家公司經理人固定薪資的差別，有相對較高的固定薪資之經理人會有較早投資的意願；第二，兩家公司經理人持股比例的差距，當固定薪資相同，且兩家公司經理人持股比例越接近時，代表著兩家公司越相似，此時搶先投資的ㄧ方，通常也會比較早破產。而當兩家公司經理人固定薪資不同時，根據情境的不同，可能把這個競爭的程度放大或是縮小，造成需要更大或是更小的持股比例差距，才能彌補固定薪資造成的影響；第三，兩家公司過去薪資和保留薪資之相對於固定薪資的位置，當過去薪資和保留薪資比固定薪資高(低)時，經理人持股比例上升時，其最適投資門檻下降(上升)。

This article builds a real option model to investigate the investment and financing decisions in an asymmetric duopoly where the two firms’ managers are in charge of decisions and can be compensated with different fixed salaries and hold different fractions of firms’ shares. The managers’ investment and financing decisions are determined by the following three mechanisms. The first is the asymmetry between the two managers’ fixed salaries. The manager tends to invest earlier if he or she is compensated with higher fixed salary. The second is the asymmetry between the fractions of the two managers’ shares. If the firms’ managers’ fractions of shares are very similar, the two firms are more symmetric given that the two managers are compensated with the same level of fixed salary. The manager who makes a preemptive investment tends to declare bankruptcy earlier. When the two managers’ fixed salaries are different, the degree of the competition between the two firms can be enlarged or be reduced. It is therefore required a larger or smaller asymmetry between the fraction of the two manager’s shares to make up the asymmetry between the two managers’ fixed salaries. The third is the relative sizes between the previous and reservation incomes and managers’ fixed salaries. When the previous and reservation incomes are larger (smaller) than the manager’s fixed salary, the manager trends to invest earlier (later) as the fraction of the manager’s shares increases.