供應鏈品質管理垂直整合之研究-聯合檢驗與契約設計

Abstract

品質管理自二次大戰結束後，蓬勃發展自今約三十年間，各企業 對產品品質的要求逐漸從三個標準差邁向如今的六個標準差，然而， 企業發現，品質的競賽並未因此而趨緩，隨著資訊迅速發展，單是不 斷的投入成本提升自身產品品質，已無法準確地滿足市場的需求，為 能確實且迅速地對變化劇烈的全球市場做出反應，品質競賽亦從「廠 商」轉換成「鏈」的競爭，供應鏈整合的觀念，使供應鏈成員能夠共 享資訊，了解末端市場的需求並做出正確的反應，並藉由將整體供應 鏈視為同一個體的方式令所有成員從彼此對立轉換成為利益共通的 合作夥伴。本研究為供應鏈上下游品質控管設計一合作方式－「聯合 檢驗」，上游供應商為下游製造商分擔產品購入時的檢驗成本，而下 游製造商亦回饋予上游供應商為其分擔為提高產品品質而投入之品 質投入成本，藉由品質成本共擔達到供應鏈整合中風險共擔的效果， 本研究利用合作賽局探討於聯合檢驗的合作關係下，整體供應鏈所能 得到之最大利益，此外，並使用非合作賽局與合作賽局之差異探討其 契約設計方式，欲藉由契約的設計將供應鏈上下游品質控管關係導向 整合的結果。

Quality Management booms up since 1970s after world war Ⅱ. The quality requirement has developed from 3 sigma to 6 sigma till now. However, the enterprises found out that keep rising quality of their own product can no longer satisfy the varied global market. With the progress of internet and information technology, competition shifts to chain-to-chain from enterprise-to-enterprise. To response the changing global market precisely and rapidly, concept of supply chain management was applied into quality management. In this literature, we develop a relationship of supply chain quality management named “Co-inspection”. In which the supplier shares the inspection cost with the producer who purchase products from the supplier and use it to produce a new product to sell. And the producer share the quality cost of the supplier as well. The supply chain would be led into integration by risk sharing. In this literature, we discuss the quality cost of supply chain by game theory. And try to design the contract which is suppose to force integrate the supply chain.