競爭市場回收清除處理費率和補貼費率的制定政策

Abstract

近年來，環境保護的概念逐漸形成新的社會認知及規範，是否能妥善地處理經濟快速發展所造成的電子廢棄物更是廣受注意，因此各國相關的環保法令便因應而生。本研究利用Stackelberg模型求得回收體系參與者的最佳決策。依決策時間點而言，政府(基管會)為先行者，其先發佈回收清楚處理費率與補貼費率的訊息，跟隨者(責任業者及資源回收處理業者)接收訊息後，便分別制定最佳製造量及獎勵金水準。其中，為能更貼近市場現況，我們假設消費市場及回收市場分別存在多家責任業者及資源回收處理業者，且彼此之間存在著競爭行為。 許多國家現行的回收制度是採用收支平衡的概念進行回收基金的運用與管理，然而，政府為非營利的組織，其應以總體社會福利為考量。本研究根據現行收支平衡的概念以及總體社會福利最大化的目標，於相同稅收水準的假設下求得結果。接著，本研究利用數值案例進行參數敏感度分析，探討模式可能存在的趨勢。 市場競爭者數量亦會影響到整體社會福利，本研究進一步探討回收基金管理委員會於回收經營權發放的決策問題，以回收市場中資源回收處理業者的數量對總體社會福利的影響為探討的主要概念，並佐以數值案例說明模式推演過程。

The disposal of obsolete electronics products has gained considerable attention due to environmental conservation and legislative requirements. Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidy fees may play important roles in recycling. We present a Stackelberg-type model consistings of a leader (the Environmental Protection Administration, EPA) and two followers (MIS firms and recycling firms). MIS firms are the manufacturers, importers, and sellers. The MIS firms and recycling firms both consist of competitive entities. The EPA determines the ARFs paid by the MIS firms and subsidy fees subsidizing recycling firms to maximize the social welfare in closed-loop supply chains, where independent entities maximize their respective profit functions. Then we present a current practice model to determine the fees on the basis of fund balance between revenues and costs. We demonstrate that our results outperform the current practice by a numerical case. We also study how the EPA decides the optimal number of recycling licenses in the recycling market and illustrate the impact of the number of recycling licenses on the value of social welfare, total recycling quantity, reward money, and subsidy fees for the proposed model and the current practice model.