研發投資、代理問題與公司績效關係之研究-以美國公司為例

Abstract

本研究以美國1991年至2008年公開發行公司為研究樣本，探討企業內部的代理成本，是否會影響其研發投資決策對公司的績效與價值存在影響，我們發現研發投資會增加公司的市場價值，但是公司有較高的代理成本時會抵銷研發投資為公司所帶來的增值，但整體來說研發投資還是可以為公司帶來增值，即使是擁有高代理成本的公開發行公司，而根據公司管理當局與債權人之資訊不對稱性所引起的代理問題與融資順位理論，探討廠商的研發投資、代理成本、負債與股利政策，與公司價值之關係。實證結果發現研發密度較高的企業，負債水準顯著較低，股利支付率結果相同，但不顯著。企業負債水平與成長機會呈正相關，這個事實說明負債融資被公司管理者視為控制公司代理問題時的重要工具。

We observe the impact of R&D intensity and agency costs on the value of US firms for the 1991-2008 periods. We find that R&D adds market value, but high agency costs reduce market value. However, R&D investment might add value, even when firms’ agency costs are high. Based on the pecking order theory and the agency theory raised by the information asymmetry between the corporate owner-managers and debt holders, this study also study the relationship and interaction among R&D investment, agency cost, debt and dividend policy, and the firms’ value. The results are as following. Significantly, the higher R&D intensity indicates the lower debt ratio. The higher R&D intensity shows the lower payout ratio with non-significance. This appearance of things we ascribe to debt being used as a control mechanism in these firms.