BOT放棄選擇權之研究—以台灣南北高速鐵路計畫為例

Abstract

BOT（Build-Operate-Transfer）是民間參與公共建設的一種方式，即政府透過特許將公共建設之財產權賦予民間廠商，由民間投資興建，興建完成後營運一段時間，於營運期屆滿後依合約規定將公共建設以有償或無償方式移轉給政府。在BOT特許契約的設計中，政府強制收買制度的實施為一頗受爭議的課題。本研究以台灣南北高速鐵路計畫為例，利用實質選擇權中的放棄選擇權模型，來評估計畫營運階段之放棄選擇權價值，以探討政府強制收買制度。研究結果顯示，對特許公司而言，在考慮是否放棄一計畫時，應將放棄選擇權的價值一併考慮；若政府承諾收買，計畫整體價值將提高。另，若政府執行強制收買時，為考慮財政負擔，可採用分期付款的方式，但需考量付款方式對放棄選擇價值之影響。最後，特許公司執行放棄選擇權之機會與計畫之現金流量相關。根據政府之高鐵財務預測報告，台灣高鐵公司執行放棄選擇權之機會極小。

BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) is an approach for private participation in infrastructure. Under the BOT approach, government usually creates the property rights of infrastructure projects and transfers them to the private sector by concessions; the private sector then is responsible for the investment, construction and operation of the projects for certain concession periods. Once the concessions expire, the private sector, according to the concession contracts, will transfer the assets of the project to government with or without compensation. In the design of BOT concession agreement, the use of compulsory purchase arrangement is a contentious issue.This research uses the Taiwan North-South High-Speed Railway Project (THR) to study compulsory purchase is from the perspective of private investors. Compulsory purchase, the value are treated as a kind of abandonment options. The results reveal that the commitment of compulsory purchases creates project values. The values of abandonment options depend on several factors, such as project cash flows and compulsory purchase arrangement. According the government's financial report of THR projects, the chance for private investor to exercise the abandonment option is very small.