以網路模式分析台北地區計程車市場在管制與競爭下之供需最適解

Abstract

在經濟發展及都市化程度高的大都會區內，擁有副大眾運輸工具特色的計程車在整體運輸服務系統中扮演了不可缺少的角色。然而，因為其供需資訊不對稱的市場特性，管制者在設定價格及計程車數量的政策時，需從不同考量角度兼顧業者收益及消費者權益，以達到整體市場之公平與效率。 本研究利用Yang及Wang(1998)設計的計程車網路模式為架構，建立以社會福利最大下之市場最佳解及損益平衡下之市場次佳解為目標式的經濟模型，並利用台灣大車隊在台北地區(台北縣市及基隆市)的計程車載客旅次O-D資料，分析營運方式以巡迴招攬乘客為主的台北地區計程車市場，在不同管制情況及競爭下，以小時為計算單位的最適價格、最適營運車輛數及最適時間空車率。 實證研究結果發現，當價格彈性為-1.4而等車時間彈性為-0.2時，最適合計程車市場營運之損益平衡市場次佳解的費率將會落在＄370元/小時，而若以每日營運九小時來計算，此時市場內之最適車輛數為42,325輛，又最適空車率為54.51%。然而在2002年11月登記的68,898輛計程車數及目前每小時640元的收費皆與最適情況相去頗遠。本研究結果顯示目前計程車業者在空車率過高的情況下，即使收取較高的費用，仍無法維持其合理的薪資；且消費者雖然可因滿街的空車而減少其等車時間，然而過高的費率卻使市場無法達到最適的需求量。因此本研究依數值分析的結果，設定若干個合理的收費方案，並建議降低市場車輛數的上限及提高計程車營業執照的擁有成本，提供給主管單位作為調整費率及車輛管制政策的參考。

In a well-developed and highly urbanized metropolitan area, taxicabs play an essential role as paratransits in the entire transportation service system. However, due to the market’s information asymmetry, suppliers’ benefit and users’ rights should be considered when a regulator sets the price level and numbers of taxis to achieve the market’s equity and efficiency. This paper applies the urban taxi network model proposed by Yang and Wang (1998) and constructs an economic model to solve the first-best solution under maximized social welfare and second-best solution under break-even. The event study of Taipei Area taxi market used the O-D surveys of Taiwantaxi company to analyze the cruising taxi market’s hourly optimal price, operating vehicles and vacant taxi rate under different regulations and competition simulation. The results show that whenever the price elasticity and waiting time elasticity were -1.4 and -0.2, respectively, the second-best market’s price level will be $370/hr and, with 9 working-hours a day, optimal licensed operation vehicles will be 42,325. Meanwhile, the optimal vacant taxi rate will then be 54.51%. Comparing to the real world, these results are far away from the status quo, 68,898 vehicles and $640/hr. We also find that the existing vacant taxi rate will not sustain the drivers’ reasonable wage even with a higher price; the market will also not reach it’s maximized quantity of demand under existing vacant taxi rate though the waiting time is rather short. Finally we use the numerical results to design some pricing structure schemes, and suggest that the market’s quantity ceiling should be lowered and the cost of getting an operating license should be raised.